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WHO's looking after the tobacco industry
Abstract
On 21st May 2003, after four years of negotiation, the World Health Assembly (WHA) adopted the World
Health Organisation (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Once ratified this framework
convention will ultimately constrain the activities of the tobacco industry globally. In light of increasing
litigation and exposure of the industry’s strategies to maintain profitability, will the tobacco industry
remain quiescent on this further threat to their legitimacy? A weapon in the tobacco industry’s armoury is
to redefine the public policy agenda via a legitimate forum. This can include eliciting debate in any
credible forum and in doing so, attempt to validate all points of view (Davidson, 1991), This legitimating
forum can include corporate social reporting (CSR) (Deegan, 2002), as practised by British American
Tobacco in 2001/2002, an exemplar for an industry dominated by several large multinational corporations
(Davidson, 1991: Sethi &Steidlmeier, 1991).
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Introduction
On 21st May 2003, after four years of negotiation, the World Health Assembly
(WHA) adopted the World Health Organisation (WHO) Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control. Once ratified this framework convention will ultimately constrain
the activities of the tobacco industry globally. In light of increasing litigation and
exposure of the industry’s strategies to maintain profitability, will the tobacco
industry remain quiescent on this further threat to their legitimacy? A weapon in the
tobacco industry’s armoury is to redefine the public policy agenda via a legitimate
forum. This can include eliciting debate in any credible forum and in doing so,
attempt to validate all points of view (Davidson, 1991), This legitimating forum can
include corporate social reporting (CSR) (Deegan, 2002), as practised by British
American Tobacco in 2001/2002, an exemplar for an industry dominated by several
large multinational corporations (Davidson, 1991: Sethi &Steidlmeier, 1991).

Background
On the 24th May 1999 the WHA, the governing body of the WHO, resolved to
commence work on the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). A
Framework Convention is a legal treaty or international agreement between states in
written form and governed by international law. This convention outlines the general
objectives of health related and other tobacco issues and is supplemented by
protocols. These protocols are treaties or separate agreements entailing more specific
legal obligations (WHO, 2000).
The objective of this framework convention, as stated in the document is
…to protect present and future generations from the devastating
health, social, environmental and economic consequences of tobacco
consumption and exposure to tobacco smoke (WHO, 2003a p. 7)
This overarching objective encompasses: protecting children, adolescents and
vulnerable communities from tobacco through their exposure to smoking and the
marketing of tobacco products; addressing the prevention and treatment of tobacco
dependence; promoting a smoke-free environment and tobacco-free economies. More
specifically, WHO envisages that the protocols could address issues such as
advertising, package design and labelling, environmental tobacco smoke (passive
smoking), agricultural diversification and smuggling (WHO, 2000).
Smoking and tobacco related issues have worldwide prominence and are publicly
contested. For the first time the FCTC will provide a coordinated, organised and
authoritative effort to comprehensively address these issues. In contrast, previous
attempts from outside the industry have been piecemeal and parochial. The stated
ultimate aim of WHO, through the FCTC, is to abrogate the social and health-related
risks by the reduction of tobacco smoking globally. In so doing, there is recognition of
the anticipated economic effects of tobacco control. In the short to medium term,

WHO expects, those economies relying heavily on tobacco exports will suffer until
agricultural diversification is established. However, WHO argues, that the benefit in
terms of decreased health and social costs will outweigh the direct economic benefits
from tobacco cultivation (WHO, 2000).

Industry Pressures
Organisational legitimacy has been a pressing issue for the tobacco industry for
several decades. The FCTC, once formally ratified, will constrain the tobacco industry
and the multinational corporations that operate within it. In a climate of decreasing
tolerance of tobacco-related issues, a coalition of tobacco companies launched
voluntary international minimum Marketing Standards in 2001 (BAT, 2001).
According to the Chairman of British American Tobacco (BAT), this initiative was
designed to “raise the bar” in terms of advertising, packaging and sponsorship
(Broughton, 2001, p.4). Building on this image of an industry capable of selfregulation, BAT produced its first Social Report for the year 2001/2002 as an attempt
to provide “broader accountability to stakeholders” and to present “clear evidence of a
socially responsible tobacco company” (BAT, 2002 (a), p.1). At this point it is worth
noting the interesting time line of events. In 1999, WHA commences negotiations on
a treaty to significantly curb the increase of tobacco use worldwide and the tobacco
industry within two years introduced its own standards and BAT repositions itself to
appear as a ‘transparent’ and responsible corporate citizen.
British American Tobacco, is a major player with over fifteen percent market share in
tobacco and tobacco-related products. This includes ‘doing business’ in 180 countries,
controlling 250,000 tobacco farmers, running 84 factories in 64 countries and
employing 85,000 people globally. From direct and indirect tax, governments are
estimated to gather £14 billion annually (BAT, 2002(a)). The move into social
reporting has provided an avenue for BAT to go beyond the narrow technical aspects
of tobacco marketing and enter the dialogue on more conceptual social issues, by
providing a platform in the public policy arena. According to BAT, the ultimate
question for stakeholders is, who would they prefer to manage the tobacco industry?
BAT identifies the options as, either the legitimate well-run responsible tobacco
industry or organised crime, the counterfeiters and the back-door salesman likely to
flourish under the new framework (Broughton, 2001). The management of BAT are,
however, in agreement with some of the aspirations of the WHO initiative, but
question the appropriateness of a global health organisation to properly address the
issues surrounding the whole tobacco debate. Much of this debate centres on
proprietary rights and the commercial secrets implication of full product disclosure.
The WHO, according to BAT, has not engaged the tobacco industry as an important
player and has excluded it from the FCTC negotiations (BAT, 2001). BAT contests
the validity of data and the method for calculating the future mortality statistics
generated by WHO, as the basis for implementing the FCTC. Contesting those data
and those methods, also undermines the legitimacy of WHO and its objectives. “To
debate the question in any serious forum is in itself a victory for the tobacco forces
because it presumes that either side may be correct” (Davidson, 1991, p. 54)

The Debate
The conflict and ensuing debate differentiates the ‘economic view’, which is the
argument taken by the tobacco industry, and the ‘health or social view’ taken by
WHO. This conflict is exacerbated in the Third World, developing countries in which
issues surrounding economic development dominate health issues1. The consumption
of cigarettes in the Third World is increasing through sophisticated mass marketing
and promotion. Apart from the health issues there is the problem of land degradation,
deforestation and the shift away from food production to revenue producing tobacco
crops (Sethi and Steidlmeier, 1991). As one of the most heavily taxed commodities,
tobacco provides significant revenue from tax, income to farmers, income to
processors and foreign exchange (Sethi and Steidlmeier, 1991). BAT enters this
debate by contesting the appropriateness of a “one size fits all” approach by WHO
(BAT, 2002(b)) as a “clumsy imposition of first world solutions” threatening selfdetermination and an example of moral and cultural imperialism (Broughton, 2001, p
2). BAT further expands the argument to capture the World Bank’s alignment with
WHO as the ‘dark side’ of globalisation and an abuse of power (Broughton, 2001).
Although we are in tacit agreement with these sentiments, the championing voice of a
multinational corporation relying on an overtly dangerous product for economic
survival is questionable in the extreme.
The global tobacco industry is considered by BAT to be indispensable in terms of
employment and taxation revenue. And, the tobacco issue has broader implications.
For example, there are significant concerns regarding smuggling and illegal aspects,
agricultural issues such as biodiversity, chemical use and deforestation, as well the
health issues, which WHO seeks to address in the FCTC. In question is whether the
tobacco industry can self-regulate through industry standards and corporate social
reporting, and encompass not only the economic, but also the social and political
aspects of the debate.

Concluding Remarks
The FCTC is now on the table. Once forty of the member states (192) ratify, accept or
approve the FCTC it is legally binding on those states and for every other state that
ratifies, accepts or approves from that point.. At the time of writing 47 states have
become signatories, indicating political support and a commitment to abide by the
principles until ratification (WHO, 2003b). Only Norway has become a signatory and
also formally ratified the FCTC. How will the tobacco-industry respond? An initial
reaction indicates that, although excluded from negotiations, BAT intends to lobby
governments at national level to offer proposals and solutions for “real and workable
tobacco regulation” (BAT, 2003).
BAT’s pre-emptive move into public policy debate via social reporting has provided
legitimacy for the tobacco industry to contest the appropriateness and validity of the
FCTC. As Davidson (1991, p.54) asserted “[p]erhaps no move has been more critical
to the tobacco industry’s [legitimation] strategy than its efforts to redefine the public
policy agenda” by shifting issues and directing public attention away from health to
1

The social, political and historical implications of this issue are acknowledged, but are not within the
ambit of this paper.

economic issues. More than a decade later it appears the same strategies prevail with
corporate social reporting included in the armoury.
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